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I
Introduction
Patent protection for computer related inventions is determined
during ex parte examination before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO).' The duty of the PTO is to issue valid pat-
ents.2 Therefore, it is essential from the PTO's perspective to have
uniform and definite standards for a patent. The PTO is often the
only entity in a position to set or argue for such standards. Two issues
arising from computer-related inventions demonstrate how the PTO
seeks consistent development of its standards.
The first issue is mathematical algorithms 3 and statutory subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Mathematical algorithms are a major
issue in PTO practice and computer law, due to the nature of com-
puters4 and the rising importance of mathematical techniques in com-
puter science and electrical engineering. Mathematical algorithms
per se are not eligible for patent protection; however, their application
to physical elements or process steps may be.
The second issue is the interpretation of means-plus-function lim-
itations5 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 6 during examination before the
PTO. This article traces the development of this issue from its begin-
ning in the context of its rejection as a mathematical algorithm under
35 U.S.C. § 101, to a general issue of PTO claim interpretation, and to
two in banc decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the
1. Patents are issued if it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the
law. 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 151 (1984).
2. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877) ("[In the Patent
Office, an applicant's] claim is, or is supposed to be, examined, scrutinized, limited, and
made to conform to what he is entitled to."); Burns v. Meyer, 100 U.S. 671, 672 (1879);
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) ("[T]he primary responsibility for sifting
out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office. To await litigation is-for all practical
purposes-to debilitate the patent system.").
3. A mathematical algorithm is a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
4. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 764, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397, 404 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ("In
the computer arts, § 101 problems tend to center around the use of mathematics in the
claims, which define the invention for which patent protection is sought. This is a natural
consequence of the nature of computers.").
5. A "means-plus-function" (or "means for") limitation is a method of claiming per-
mitted under 35 U.S.C. § 112 6. Section 112 6 permits claiming one element of a
combination of elements as a "means" or "step" for performing a specified function (e.g.,
means for fastening) instead of reciting the actual "structure, materials, or acts" (e.g., a
rivet). This method of claiming is often simpler than claiming the detailed structure and
has the advantage that the claim covers "equivalents" of the disclosed structure.
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Federal Circuit,6 one of which involves mathematical algorithms and
computers.
II
Mathematical Algorithms
A. Background
Inventions are eligible for patent protection only if they fall
within one of the four statutory classes of subject matter of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101:1 process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
Congress intended this provision to be construed broadly to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man."8 Nevertheless, judi-
cially determined exceptions exist for "laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas," 9 which embrace loose categories of cases
such as mathematical algorithms, methods of doing business1° and
printed matter. Due to their abstract, nonphysical nature, computer
programs and data structures are considered to be nonstatutory sub-
ject matter. "Software" in patents refers to computer programs in-
cluded in the statutory categories of "process" or "machine."' 1
In 1972, the Supreme Court held mathematical algorithms to be
nonstatutory subject matter because they did not fall within the
35 U.S.C. § 101 statutory class of a "process.' 1 2 From 1972 to 1982, a
series of twenty-five decisions by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) and two more Supreme Court cases resolved much
of the uncertainty regarding the patentability of mathematical algo-
rithms and computer programs. These decisions also developed an
analytical framework for treatment of cases in this area. "Thus com-
puters came to be generally recognized as devices capable of perform-
ing or implementing process steps, or serving as components of an
6. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions of the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) under 35
U.S.C. § 141, and from decisions of district court actions under 35 U.S.C. § 145 for review
of Board decisions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(4)(A), (C) (1994).
7. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
9. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
10. See discussion infra part II.C.
11. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 730, 737 (C.C.P.A. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (Rich, J. dissenting) ("It has never been otherwise than
perfectly clear to those desiring patent protection on inventions which are new and useful
programs for general purpose computers (software) that the only way it could be obtained
would be to describe and claim (35 U.S.C. § 112) the invention as a 'process' or a
'machine."').
12. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
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apparatus, without negating patentability of the process or the
apparatus.
13
In 1989, the PTO was criticized for issuing patents involving
mathematical algorithms and software.14 In response to this public
concern, the PTO published an analysis of case law in the area of
mathematical algorithms and computer programs. 15 The analysis was
designed to clarify and state the existing practice for PTO examiners
and the public rather than to change policy. The analysis confirmed
the PTO's adherence to the two-step protocol for determining
whether a mathematical algorithm qualifies as statutory subject mat-
ter. This two-step protocol was originally developed by the CCPA in
In re Freeman,16 In re Walter and In re Abele, 7 known as the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test. The first step is to determine whether a mathemati-
cal algorithm is recited directly or indirectly in the claim. 8 If so, the
second step is to determine whether the claimed invention as a whole
is directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied to or lim-
ited by physical elements or process steps.19 The goal is to answer the
following question: "What did applicants invent?"" °
B. In re Grams
In its first published decision involving mathematical algorithms,
In re Grams,2 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a deci-
sion of the Board holding that mathematical algorithm process claims
were nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The in-
dependent claim in Grams was a method for testing a complex sys-
13. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
14. Edmund L. Andrews, Patents on Equations: Some See a Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 1989, at D1; Lawrence M. Fisher, Software Industry in Uproar Over Recent Rush of
Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1989, at Al. \
15. Patentable Subject Matter, Mathematical Algorithms and Computer Programs, 1106
Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 5 (Sept. 5, 1989).
16. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
17. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
18. Id. at 905. The claim is that portion of the patent application which "point[s] out
and distinctly claim[s] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his [or her] inven-
tion." 35 U.S.C. § 112 2 (1984).
19. Id. at 907.
20. Id. The question is based on the statutory language of section 101: "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter ...." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
21. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). An earlier judgment of affirmance without opinion
under Fed. Cir. R. 36(c) was entered in In re Allington, 871 F.2d 1096, 1989 WL 16030
(Fed. Cir. 1989), which involved a section 101 mathematical algorithm rejection of a claim
in means-plus-function format for predicting the equilibrium value of a characteristic of a
process.
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tem22 to determine whether the system condition was normal or
abnormal. 23 The first step required performing a series of clinical lab-
oratory tests on an individual to measure the values of chemical and
biological constituents.24 The remainder of the steps operated on this
data to determine which tests were abnormal. 25 Although no sym-
bolic equations or formulae were recited in the claim, the specification
disclosed that the measured data values were formed in a vector, and
used to compute a "Mahalanobis or weighted distance quantity D2"
with mathematical vector operations. The calculated "distance" was
compared to a known predetermined value to determine whether the
individual's condition was abnormal. Claim 16, the only dependent
claim to be argued separately, required that the method be performed
with a programmed computer.26
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals applied the two-step test in
a straightforward manner and held the claims nonstatutory. First, it
found that all the steps were mathematical algorithm except the initial
step of performing the clinical laboratory tests on individuals to obtain
data.27 Second, it determined that only the physical process step of
performing laboratory tests involved gathering data for the algorithm,
which was not sufficient to render the claim statutory.28 The court
observed that a claim that may contain statutory matter without the
algorithm is not dispositive. The algorithm must operate on the
claimed physical step.29 Thus, although performing clinical laboratory
tests is a physical step that might be considered a statutory process,
the court of appeals noted the mathematical algorithm did not change
any physical aspects of this step.
From the PTO's perspective, several points are important about
Grams. First, the decision applied the mathematical algorithm analy-
sis in a straightforward manner consistent with previous cases, which
is useful for analyzing similar claims; it undoubtedly helped that the
claim was a process claim, the usual form for mathematical algorithm
analysis.3" Second, it confirmed that it is proper to look to the specifi-
22. The invention in Grams was "applicable to any complex system, whether it be
electrical, mechanical, chemical, biological, or combinations thereof." 888 F.2d at 836.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 836, step [a].
25. Id. at 836-37, steps [b] - [e].
26. Id. at 841.
27. Id. at 840.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 839 n.4, 840.
30. Mathematical algorithms are a "procedure for solving a given type of mathemati-
cal problem." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). Thus, a mathematical al-
1994]
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cation to see if a mathematical algorithm is indirectly recited.3 Third,
it clarified that the mere presence of a physical step does not automat-
ically transform a claim into statutory subject matter.32 Fourth, and
most important in computer process cases, Grams held that perform-
ing the method on a programmed computer is not dispositive of the
statutory subject matter inquiry.
C. In re Schrader
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a section 101
mathematical algorithm rejection of a method of auctioning in In re
Schrader.34 According to the method, bidders may bid on one, some,
or all of the items offered in any combination, and the bids are en-
tered into a "record. ' 35 The entered bids are then assembled into a
"completion. 36 Thus, all items to be sold appear in the completion
either as a bid on an individual item or on a group of items (i.e., the
completion completes the sale of all items), and each item appears
only once in the completion because the same item cannot be sold
twice. Unlike a conventional auction, the auction under the claimed
method is not finished and no items are sold until the very end of the
bidding. No hardware, such as a computer, was disclosed in the speci-
fication for performing the steps of the process.
The Board affirmed an examiner's rejection under section 101 as
a method of doing business. More generally, the Board held that the
claimed method did not fit within the section 101 definition of a "pro-
cess" because it did not transform or reduce subject matter to a differ-
ent state or thing.37 The Board further found that the claims
contained a mathematical algorithm.38
The majority held that the claims were nonstatutory subject mat-
ter as a mathematical algorithm. The claimed step of "assembling a
completion" implicitly contained a mathematical algorithm under the
first step of the Freeman-Walter-A bele test because it determines the
optimal combination of bids. 39 The claims did not recite or imply suf-
gorithm is defined as a series of process steps. Mathematical algorithms were held not to
fall within the section 101 statutory category of a "process." Id.
31. 888 F.2d at 837.
32. Id. at 839 and n.4.
33. Id. at 841.
34. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
35. Id. at 291.
36. A completion is a combination of bids that "would complete a sale of all of the
items being offered at the highest offered total price." Id.
37. Id. at 292.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 293.
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ficient physical activity to qualify under the second step of the test.
The court noted that physical activity such as "the notion of bidders
assembled in a single location in front of a display, or in several loca-
tions interconnected by closed-circuit television through a large screen
display is not recited in the claim."4 The only physical effect required
by the claim was entering the bids in a "record." The court stated that
such activity was indistinguishable from the data gathering steps in
Grams,41 and was implicit in any application of a mathematical al-
gorithm.42 The court agreed that the term "process" in section 101
included a requirement that there be a transformation or reduction of
subject matter.43
In making statutory subject matter determinations under section
101, the PTO has often relied upon the definition of "process" as
transformation and reduction of subject matter to a different state or
thing. The court's acceptance of this definition should be considered
in future section 101 analyses. Unfortunately, there is no clear defini-
tion of what is meant by "subject matter." The court states that
"changes to intangible subject matter representative of or constituting
physical activity or objects are included in the definition." 4 The PTO
argued that the subject matter, whether tangible matter or intangible
energy (e.g., heat, light, or electricity), had to be physical. Thus the
PTO argued that transformation of property ownership from one per-
son to another, or transformation of goods for money, in Schrader's
method was not what was meant by transformation and reduction of
subject matter. Likewise, transformation of abstract subject matter,
such as numerical data, is not what was meant.45
The term "method of doing business," one ground of the rejec-
tion, is not mentioned in the majority opinion. In her dissent, Judge
Newman agreed with the Board's remark that the "method of doing
business" ground is a "fuzzy" concept and stated that "since it also an
unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject mat-
ter in section 101, my guidance is that it be discarded as error-prone,
redundant, and obsolete."46 Although it is often mentioned as an ex-
40. Id. at 294.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 295.
44. Id. at 295 n.12.
45. See In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1979). "[Wlhere, as here, the
claims solely recite a method whereby a set of numbers is computed from a different set of
numbers by merely performing a series of mathematical computations, the claims do not
set forth a statutory process." Id.
46. Id. at 298.
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ception to section 101,47 few, if any, cases have ever been decided on a
method of doing business rationale. The proper approach to such
cases is to apply the definition of a section 101 "process," which may
indeed be the original rationale for the exception.48
D. In re Warmerdam
In re Warmerdam49 involved an invention in the field of automa-
tion and robotics, specifically, in the area of collision detection. Geo-
metric representations of objects are used to calculate whether two
objects will collide. Collision calculations using precise representa-
tions of the object are time consuming, and fast calculation is usually
more important than geometric accuracy. Therefore, objects are mod-
elled as larger and more regular in shape using simple geometric
solids.
A known prior art method simplfying solid modelling was used to
represent the objects as a hierarchy of imaginary intersecting spheres
or "bubbles" whose surfaces bound the object.5" The hierarchy was
stored in a tree data structure.51 A tree data structure is a special kind
of mathematical graph having a collection of nodes connected by
pointers. Each node contains the following data about a bubble: the
x-, y- and z-locations of its center and the radius. The root of the tree
is a unique node representing a single bubble encompassing the whole
object. The next lower level of the tree breaks the single bubble into
multiple bubbles of smaller diameter, represented by pointers from
the root node to two or more nodes at the next lower level. The rep-
resentation continues with each succeeding level of nodes represent-
ing bubbles of progressively finer levels of detail;5 2 thus, the term
bubble hierarchy. The union of all bubbles at a particular level
bounds the entire object." Collisions between two objects can be de-
47. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.03[51 (1993).
48. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 166 (1890). "Hence a plan or theory of action which, if carried into logical practice, could
produce no physical results proceeding directly from the operation of the theory or plan
itself, is not an art within the meaning of the Patent Law, however greatly it may promote
the comfort or the welfare of mankind." Id.
49. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
50. Id. at 1755. The prior art was represented by the article by G. Sawatzky and H. El-
Zorkany, Using an Efficient Collision Detector in the Solution of the Find-Path Problem of
Industrial Robots, 579 SPIE PROC. 131 (Sept. 16-20, 1985).
51. A data structure is a "physical or logical relationship among data elements,
designed to support specific data manipulation functions." Warmerdam, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1760 (quoting IEEE STANDARD COMPUTER DICTIONARY (1991)).
52. Id. at 1755.
53. Id.
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tected using bubbles on respective trees by comparing the distance
between their centers and the sum of their radii.54
Warmerdam's improvement was to locate the center of the bub-
bles along the "medial axis."55 The medial axis (or skeleton) is an
abstract representation of a two- or three-dimensional region by curve
segments. 6 Another mathematical property of the medial axis is that
every point on the medial axis is the closest point to two or more
points on the boundary of the region. The disclosed method for locat-
ing the medial axis was a mathematical procedure known as the
Hilditch Skeletonization method. 7
In Warmerdam's application, claims one through four were to a
method for generating a data structure comprising the steps of locat-
ing the medial axis of the object and then creating a hierarchy of bub-
bles on the medial axis.58 The Board determined that the claims were
nonstatutory subject matter under section 101 because they recited no
more than a mathematical algorithm in the abstract. 9 Warmerdam
argued that the step of locating the medial axis was broad enough to
cover methods which involve physically measuring the contour of the
object.60 The court, however, agreed with the PTO that the disclosed
preferred embodiment was mathematical in nature in the sense that
"the preferred, and it appears the only practical, embodiment of
claimed method involves steps which are essentially mathematical in
nature, i.e., utilization of the Hilditch Skeletonization method to lo-
cate the medial axis, followed by utilization of a top-down or bottom-
up procedure for creating the bubble hierarchy. ' 61 Nevertheless, the
court did not resolve the question of statutory subject matter in math-
ematical algorithm terms, stating that "the dispositive issue for assess-
ing compliance with § 101 in this case is whether the claim is for a
process that goes beyond simply manipulating 'abstract ideas' or 'nat-
ural phenomena."' 62 The appellate court affirmed the Board's rejec-
tion of claims one through four, and six, under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
court further held that the "steps describe nothing more than the ma-
54. Id. at 1755-56.
55. Id. at 1756.
56. "The medial axis of an object is defined in the specification to be 'a line with the
same topology as the object itself connecting points which lie midway between boundary
centers of the object."' Id.
57. Id. at 1758.
58. Id. at 1756.
59. Id. at 1757.
60. Id. at 1758.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1758-59.
19941
nipulation of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic 'ab-
stract idea."'63
Claim six was to a data structure generated by any of the method
claims, i.e., to a data structure per se. The PTO argued that this claim
was also nonstatutory because the claimed data structure "is not one
of the categories of subject matter listed in section 101, or improve-
ments thereof."64 Furthermore, the PTO argued, a data structure is
not a process under section 101 because it contains no steps. The
three product classes of patentable subject matter under section 101,
"machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," deal with physical
things, not abstractions.6 5 A data structure per se is not a physical
thing; it is an abstract relationship among data elements which them-
selves have no physical substance.66 The court agreed with the PTO's
reasoning and affirmed the section 101 rejection. The court stated
that "[s]ince the 'data structure' of claim 6 is nothing more than an-
other way of describing the manipulation of ideas contained in claims
1-4, it suffers from the same fatal defect they do."67 Warmerdam's
impact on data structure claims may be influenced by the recent deci-
sion, In re Lowry,68 which involved an obviousness rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 103 of a "data structure stored in memory. ' 69 As of this writ-
ing, it is too soon to determine what effect Lowry will have on PTO
practice.
Warmerdam applied the approach that nonstatutory subject mat-
ter should be described in terms of the statute and "the Supreme
Court's basic principles as enunciated in Diehr,"70 i.e., that only things
excluded from patent protection are "laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas."'" It is not known whether Warmerdam rep-
63. Id. at 1759.
64. Id. at 1760.
65. "A machine is a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and com-
bination of devices. . ... A machine is not a principle or an idea." Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1864). "[M]anufacture" means "the production of articles for use from
raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or
combinations, whether by hand or by machinery." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
308 (1980) (quoting American Fruit Growers, Inc: v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
"[C]omposition of matter" "covers all compositions of two or more substances and in-
cludes all composite articles, whether they be results of chemical union, or of mechanical
mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids." Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson,
149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957).
66. See supra note 51.
67. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
68. No. 93-1558, 1994 WL 460721 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 1994).
69. Id.
70. Warmerdam, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758. See also discussion infra part III.E.4.
71. Id. at 1757 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
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resents a shift away from the two-step Freeman-Walter-Abele test for
mathematical algorithm-statutory subject matter. The PTO will con-
tinue to apply the two-step test. The second step of the test, whether
the mathematical algorithm is applied to an otherwise statutory pro-
cess, examines whether the claim is merely to an abstract idea. This is
consistent with the Warmerdam analysis.
III
Interpretation of Means-Plus-Function Limitations
A major controversy in the last three years has been the PTO's
interpretation of claims drafted in means-plus-function 72 format as
permitted by 35 U.S.C. § 112, last paragraph (% 6) .7 3 The Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals recently decided two cases which address this
issue, one in the context of patentability rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102 and 103, In re Donaldson Company, Inc.,74 and the other in the
context of nonstatutory subject matter rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, In re Alappat.75 The PTO was reversed in both cases. Never-
theless, the developments leading up to the decisions are of interest
because they illustrate how the PTO tries to maintain consistent de-
velopments in the law and because many of the PTO arguments are
not found outside the briefs. Sections A through D below discuss the
background leading up to Donaldson and Alappat. Section E dis-
cusses the arguments made by the PTO in both cases, as well the deci-
sions by the court.
A. Background
The last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was enacted in 1952 to leg-
islatively overrule Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.7 6
Claims in means-plus-function format had been around since the mid-
1800s, but there was uncertainty over interpreting such limitations.77
72. See supra note 6.
73. Originally enacted as the third paragraph of section 112. Act of July 19, 1952,
ch. 950, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 798-99 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1984)). Section 112, last paragraph, provides:
An element of a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts
in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
74. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
75. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 1994). The Board decision is pub-
lished at Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992).
76. 329 U.S. 1 (1946). See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act,
35 U.S.C.A. 1, 25 (1954); In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 n.ll (C.C.P.A. 1963).
77. 2 ANTHONY N. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 166-168 (1937).
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In Halliburton, the Supreme Court held a combination claim invalid
under Rev. Stat. § 4888 (the predecessor to 35 U.S.C. § 112 2) in an
infringement context. The first reason was that the claim described
the crucial element at the exact point of novelty in terms of a means-
plus-function limitation "rather than in terms of its own physical char-
acteristics or its arrangement in the new combination apparatus. ' 78
The second reason was that the means-plus-function limitation was
not limited to covering an "actual equivalent" of the means disclosed,
but would give "broad rights to bar the use of all devices now or here-
after known which could [perform the function]., 79 The Supreme
Court feared that such broad functional claims would frighten subse-
quent inventive genius from the course of experimentation.80
The Supreme Court's analysis of the second problem of "undue
breadth" under the predecessor of section 112, paragraph two, was
common at the time.81 However, more recently it has been appreci-
ated that the statutory basis is, more accurately, the enabling disclo-
sure requirement of section 112, paragraph one. That is, the enabling
disclosure of the specification is not commensurate with the broad
scope of the claims.82
In its last paragraph, section 112, overcame the two problems in
Halliburton in the following specific ways. The first clause sanctioned
means-plus-function limitations "without the recital of structure, ma-
terial, or acts in support thereof."83 Therefore, "[i]t would appear that
Congress clearly intended that paragraph 3 would 'permit combina-
tion claims to be expressed functionally at the exact point of nov-
elty."' 84 The second clause provides a statutory construction of
combination claims means-plus-function limitations narrow enough to
avoid the problem of undue breadth forbidden by section 112, para-
graph 1 This was the construction imposed by courts in infringe-
ments prior to Halliburton.86 Thus, section 112, paragraph six,
78. 329 U.S. at 9.
79. Id. at 12, 13.
80. Id. at 12.
81. See Paul H. Blaustein, Functional Claims Under the Patent Act of 1952, 26 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 613, 614 (1958); C. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legisla-
tive Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 683 (1955).
82. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d
904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984).
84. Blaustein, supra note 81, at 618.
85. Hyatt, 708 F.2d at 714.
86. See In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 n.11; Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon Form Lathe
Co., 87 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1937) (citations omitted) ("An inventor cannot by the mere
use of the word 'means' appropriate any and all kinds of mechanism or devices which may
perform the specified function, or any other mechanism or device than that which is de-
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operates like the reverse doctrine of equivalents to restrict the scope
of the literal claim language. 87
Section 112, paragraph six, has several effects in examination.
The PTO accepts the more convenient means-plus-function form, re-
gardless of whether it is at the point of novelty, and regardless of
whether such means-plus-function limitation is broader than the en-
abling disclosure. The PTO relies on the reverse doctrine of
equivalents effect of section 112, paragraph six to protect future inno-
vators.88 However, prior to Donaldson89 and Alappat,9° in the PTO's
view, section 112, paragraph six, was not intended to limit the scope of
claims during examination. 91 Ex parte determinations of statutory
subject matter under section 101, novelty under section 102, nonobvi-
ousness under section 103, and definiteness under section 112, para-
graph two, were determined according to the literal language of the
claims.
There is an interesting relationship between claims drafted in
means-plus-function format and mathematical algorithms. Mathemat-
ical algorithms usually involve process claims.92 Claims directed to
the section 101 classes of "machine" or "manufacture" are statutory
subject matter because the calculation method remains free for use by
anyone not employing the specific apparatus.93 Means-plus-function
claims are said to be apparatus claims.94 However, it was recognized
by the CCPA that the form of the claim is not determinative of statu-
tory subject matter and that a claim, though drafted in means-plus-
function "apparatus" terms, may be treated in certain circumstances
scribed in the patent or which is its mechanical equivalent."); Harris, supra note 81, at 687-
688.
87. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
88. Cf. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added):
The business of the PTO is patentability, not infringement. Like the judicially-
developed doctrine of equivalents, designed to protect the patentee with respect
to later-developed variations of the claimed invention, the judicially-developed
"reverse doctrine of equivalents," requiring interpretation of claims in light of the
specification, may be safely relied upon to preclude improper enforcement
against later developers. The courts have consistently considered subsequently
existing states of the art as raising questions of infringement, but never of validity.
89. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
90. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 1994).
91. See discussion infra part III.E.3.a.
92. See supra note 30.
93. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1247 n.l (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Bernhart,
417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ("[A] member of the public would have to do much
more than use the equations to infringe any of these [apparatus] claims.").
94. Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1247.
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as indistinguishable from a process.95 If "the claims are truly drawn to
specific apparatus distinct from other apparatus capable of performing
the identical functions, ' 96 the claims will not be treated as processes.
Prior to Donaldson and Alappat, the PTO did not read implicit limita-
tions of structure or interconnection into means clauses. 97 The Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Alappat affects the way
claims in means-plus-function format are interpreted for purposes of
section 101.98
B. In re Iwahashi
The week after deciding Grams, the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided In re Iwahashi.99 The invention in Iwahashi was an
auto-correlation unit for providing auto-correlation coefficients for
use in pattern recognition."° Underlying the unit was a mathematical
theory showing that approximated values of the coefficients could be
obtained without multipliers using the square of the sum of two fac-
tors.' 0 ' The specification disclosed specific electronic circuitry for per-
forming the steps of the calculations."0 2 The sole claim recited all
elements in mean-plus-function format, except for a read only mem-
ory (ROM) which served as an electronic look-up table to deliver the
square of a number fed to it as an input. 03 The claim recited a
formula for calculating the auto-correlation coefficient.
95. This position was adopted based on a line of dissenting opinions in the CCPA by
Judge Rich and Judge Lane beginning in 1974. See Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1340, 1342 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992). This interpretation was not new. See
(Proposed) Guidelines to Examination of Programs, 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 865, 866
(Aug. 16, 1966):
Apparatus may be defined in many instances in terms of a paraphrase of a pro-
cess definition, i.e., in terms of "means for" carrying out the "function" of each
step of that process .... A claim to a series of means for carrying out the succes-
sive steps of a mathematical algorithm tells nothing of the structure of a machine
capable of so operating as to result in solving the algorithm, but merely claims, in
effect, the non-statutory algorithm.
Cases which have treated claims in "means for" language as process claims are
In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.P.A.
1980); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 n.6
(C.C.P.A. 1982); and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
96. Walter, 618 F.2d at 768.
97. See discussion infra part III.E.3.a.
98. See discussion infra part III.E.1-4.
99. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 1371.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1371-72.
103. Id. at 1375.
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The PTO argued that the term "read only memory" was as broad
as a means-plus-function recitation of means for squaring, with the
result that the claim was entirely in means-plus-function format and
indistinguishable for 35 U.S.C. § 101 purposes from a process claim.
The PTO deemed such a corresponding method claim to be nonstatu-
tory subject matter by applying the two-step test.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 1' 4 The court
stated that the ROM was not in means-plus-function form and found
that the term ROM was understood by those skilled in the art to refer
to a specific piece of apparatus.105 The court discussed the claimed
relationship between the ROM and the means and concluded that
"[t]he claim as a whole certainly defines apparatus in the form of a
combination of interrelated means.. .,"1O and held that the claim was
directed to statutory subject matter."0 7 After so holding, the court
went on to state that 35 U.S.C. § 112 6 precluded the Solicitor's
interpretation of means-plus-function limitations as encompassing
every means for performing the function.0 8 The court stated that
"[s]ection 112 6 cannot be ignored when a claim is before the PTO
any more than when it is before the courts in an issued patent."'0 9
In a notice interpreting Iwahashi, the PTO stated that the result
was consistent with previous cases." 0 Once it is determined that a
claim involving a mathematical algorithm is drawn to specific appara-
tus, rather than encompassing any and every means for performing
the recited functions, it necessarily follows that the apparatus is statu-
tory subject matter under section 101."' However, the court's state-
ment regarding section 112, paragraph 6, was considered dicta because
it followed the holding of statutory subject matter. In particular, the
notice points out that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals did not
mention or attempt to distinguish the line of CCPA cases where claims
in means-plus-function format were treated as process claims, leaving
the status of these cases in question. 1 2 Patent examiners were in-
104. Id. at 1370.
105. Id. at 1372, 1375.
106. Id. at 1375.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1375 n.1.
110. Notice Interpreting In Re Iwahashi (Fed. Cir. 1989), 1112 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 16
(Mar. 13, 1990).
111. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
112. Notice Interpreting In re Iwahashi (Fed. Cir. 1989), 1112 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 16,
16-17 (Mar. 13, 1990).
1994]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
structed to continue to apply CCPA precedent, especially where the
claims were entirely in "means for" format.
13
Unfortunately, because Iwahashi does not mention the CCPA
cases, it is not apparent why the PTO sought to have the claim treated
as a process claim. The notice was intended to clear up this confusion
and to provide guidance to patent examiners and practitioners. 114 In
view of the court of appeals' decision in Alappat regarding treatment
of means-plus-function claims, the Iwashi notice will no longer be fol-
lowed by the PTO." 5
C. In re Bond
It was only a matter of time before a case more on all fours with
the means-plus-function cases involving mathematical algorithms was
presented. In the meantime, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals re-
lied on the language of Iwahashi in the case of In re Bond,116 which
concerned an ordinary patentability determination under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102.
The invention in Bond was a telephone answering machine with
remote turn-on feature." 7 The machine owner who forgot to set the
machine to answer could call the machine and set it to answering
mode remotely by ringing the phone a certain number of times." 8
The claims recited a delay means, which would prevent the machine
from answering the owner's initial call for a predetermined period of
time after it has set itself to answer, so that the owner would not incur
toll charges." 9 Claim one was rejected as anticipated under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 because of a prior patent granted to Curtis. 20 Curtis taught a
remote turn-on circuit where the machine activates after a set number
of rings, and after activating, it answers on the first ring. 2'
The court noted that the disclosed and prior art structures are not
identical, but the claim may well be anticipated. 22 The court stated
that a means-plus-function limitation will cover equivalents, citing the
footnote in Iwahashi, but that the Board had failed to make a finding
of structural equivalence between the delay means in claim one and
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See discussion infra part III.E.1-4, IV.
116. 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 832.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 833.
122. Id.
[Vol. 16:627
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT PROTECTION
the circuitry in Curtis.'23 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals va-
cated the anticipation rejection and remanded the case to the Board
for findings regarding structural equivalence. 124
Following Bond, the Commissioner issued a directive to the ex-
amining corps concerning means-plus-function limitations.125 There-
after, the Commissioner issued a notice stating reasons why the PTO
is not required to make determinations of equivalents under sec-
tion 112, paragraph six, in patentability determinations.' 26 The PTO
declined to follow Iwahashi and Bond because it believed that these
cases represent a departure from settled law and binding precedent on
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.127
D. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Ina v. Corazonix Corp.
In Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 28
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court judg-
ment of invalidity which declared the patent claims to be mathemati-
cal algorithms and did not confer statutory subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101.129 The claims were directed to a process and appara-
tus (in means-plus-function format) "for analyzing electrocardiograph
signals to determine the presence or absence of a predetermined level
of high frequency energy in the late QRS signal."' 3 ° The presence of
such high frequency energy waves in the QRS portion of the electro-
cardiograph signal indicated that the patient was subject to ventricular
tachycardia.13 1
The court of appeals applied the Freeman-Walter-A bele test to the
process claims. 132 Certain steps of the invention were described in the
specification as performed by mathematical formulae programmed in
a digital computer. 33 Therefore, under the first step of the two-step
test, the court accepted for purposes of its analysis that the claims in-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 835.
125. Directive to the Examining Corps: Means-plus-function Limitations, signed by
Commissioner Manbeck, dated Dec. 3, 1990.
126. Applicability of the Last Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to Patentability Determina-
tions Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 1134 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 631 (Jan. 7, 1992)
reprinted in 1135 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 8 (Feb. 4, 1992), repeating much of what appears in
the expanded panel decision, which included comments of Commissioner Manbeck, in
Ex parte Isaksen, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1991).
127. Id.
128. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
129. Id. at 1054.
130. Id. at 1055.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1057-58.
133. Id. at 1055.
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directly recited a mathematical algorithm. 134 For the second step, the
court proceeded "to determine whether the process is otherwise statu-
tory; that is, we determine what the claimed steps do, independent of
how they are implemented."' 35 The court found that the electrocar-
diograph signals which were transformed from analog to digital form
were not abstractions, but real physical signals of a patient's heart
function. 136 Likewise, the court determined the claimed steps of "con-
verting", "applying", "determining", and "comparing" to be "physical
process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into an-
other.', 3 7 The Freeman-Walter-Abele standard was met because the
method was "an otherwise statutory process whose mathematical pro-
cedures were applied to physical process steps.' '1 38
The court of appeals analyzed the statutory nature of the appara-
tus claims according to the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112 6 with
reference to the patent specification, citing Iwahashi 39 The means in
the claims were described as specific electronic devices in the specifi-
cation, a conventional analog-to-digital converter, a programmed min-
icomputer, and disc memory unit. 40 The court concluded that the
apparatus claims defined a combination of interrelated means for con-
verting a particular input signal to a different output signal which con-
stituted statutory subject matter.' 4' With regard to arguments that the
final output of the claimed apparatus (and process) was simply a
number, the court of appeals noted that "the number obtained is not a
mathematical abstraction; it is a measure in microvolts of a specified
heart activity, an indicator of the risk of ventricular tachycardia.' ' 42
Arrhythmia was often cited as overruling the PTO's position on
mathematical algorithms and mathematical algorithms claimed in
means-plus-function language. The fact that Arrhythmia involved the
validity of an issued patent did affect the analysis; since patents are
presumed valid, the standard for claim interpretation is different for
patents than for applications, and section 112, paragraph six, clearly
applies to patents. Nevertheless, the PTO believed its position was
consistent with Arrhythmia. The most important factor was that both
process and apparatus claims recited physical signals in the body of
134. Id. at 1058-59.
135. Id. at 1059.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
140. 958 F.2d at 1060.
141. Id. at 1060-61.
142. Id. at 1060.
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the claim. Once it could be determined that the mathematical steps of
the algorithm were applied to transform a physical electrical signal
representing a patient's heart function from one state to another state,
the holding of statutory subject matter was not in doubt. Transforma-
tion of signals from one state to a more useful state is what much of
electrical engineering is about. Consistent with Grams,43 the court
accepted the presence of a mathematical algorithm because some of
the claimed steps were described in the specification by mathematical
formulae. 14 Many claims indirectly involve mathematical algorithms
but easily pass the second step of the test.
The problem with claims involving mathematical algorithms is
identifying the underlying statutory process or structure, which is
often more difficult than in Arrhythmia. The rule is that the claims
define the invention. Manifestly, a claim may be drawn to the abstract
mathematical algorithm even though the specification discloses spe-
cific apparatus or physical process. The PTO's job is to determine
whether the claim defines statutory subject matter. It is often impossi-
ble to say whether a "signal" is necessarily physical as opposed to an
abstract quantity,145 especially where an applicant chooses to use
equivocal language such as "data representing a signal" or to put limi-
tations in the preamble rather than the claim body. 4 6 Where the
claim meaning is unclear, examiners will reject; applicants have the
opportunity to traverse the rejection or to amend. Practitioners can
help their cause by pointing out words of physical elements or process
steps in the claims. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Alappat indicates that claims in means-plus-function format are inter-
preted by the PTO in the same manner as the patent claims were in
Arrhythmia.
143. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
144. 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
145. Compare In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 770 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ("The 'signals' processed
by the inventions of claims 10-12 may represent either physical quantities or abstract quan-
tities; the claims do not require one or the other.") with Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059
("These input signals are not abstractions; they are related to the patient's heart
function.").
146. It is often debatable whether a preamble is a limitation on the claim. See Kropa v.
Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152 (C.C.P.A. 1951); 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.06[1][d]
(1993). A preamble is usually treated as merely setting forth the environment and is not
given substantive weight. See In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1244 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
("The potential for misconstruction of preamble language requires that compelling reason
exist before that language may be given weight."). The uncertainty can be removed by
putting the limitations in the body of the claim.
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E. In re Alappat
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided the appro-
priate interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112 6 in the companion in banc
cases of In re Alappat47 and In re Donaldson Company, Inc.'48 This
discussion examines the issues in the computer-related case of
Alappat.
1. The invention
The invention in Alappat is a "rasterizer for converting vectors in
a data list representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into
anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a dis-
play means."14 9 Raster display devices use a rectangular grid of pixels
to display images on a screen. The pixels have selective illumination
intensity (brightness). Due to the discrete size of the pixels, straight
lines or curves cannot be drawn smoothly, but have a jagged staircase
or sawtooth appearance. Ripples may also appear to run along the
line as the position of the line changes on the screen. These effects are
known as "aliasing." The disclosed rasterizer takes two end points of
data representing a vector (a directed line) and calculates which pixels
to turn on to display the line. The intensity of the pixels is calculated
to provide "anti-aliasing" or smoothing of the line appearance. The
sole independent claim fifteen recites four "means for" limitations for
carrying out the conversion, all of which are disclosed as mathematical
calculations. The specification discloses special structure for perform-
ing the calculations including two arithmetic logic units, barrel shifters
and ROM look-up; in effect, a special purpose computer.
2. Procedural history
In the PTO, a first Board panel reversed an examiner's rejection
of independent claim fifteen as nonstatutory subject matter under sec-
tion 101; dependent claims sixteen through nineteen were argued to
stand or fall with claim fifteen. 150 The Board held that while claim
fifteen recited a mathematical algorithm, the claim must be consid-
ered to recite statutory subject matter because the "means for" limita-
tions in claim fifteen correlated to "conventional structure" in the
specification,'151 relying on Walter.152 The patent examiner requested
147. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 1994). The Board decision is pub-
lished at Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992).
148. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
149. Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (1992) (dissenting opinion).
150. Id. at 1348 (dissenting opinion).
151. Id. at 1349 (dissenting opinion).
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reconsideration on the basis that the decision was inconsistent with
the Commissioner's Iwahashi notice. 153 An expanded seven-member
panel, which included the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner,
reversed on reconsideration, with the three original panel members
entering a dissent.'5 4 The majority stated that claim fifteen should be
treated as a process claim for the purpose of applying the statutory
subject matter analysis under section 101 in accordance with the line
of CCPA cases. 5 The majority noted that claim fifteen did not con-
tain a specific piece of apparatus like the ROM in Iwahashi, nor did it
expressly recite a specific interrelationship among the various
means.' 56 The claim was deemed broad enough to read on "a general
purpose digital computer 'means' to perform the various steps under
program control," not just the disclosed special apparatus.' 57 The
claim so treated as a process claim was held to be nonstatutory subject
matter as a mathematical algorithm.
Applicant appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 58
Appellant filed a suggestion for hearing in banc and for the case to be
decided together with Donaldson. The PTO concurred. The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals granted the suggestion for hearing both
Alappat and Donaldson in banc. The court of appeals further directed
that three additional issues be addressed in Alappat concerning the
Commissioner's authority to constitute a new panel for purposes of
reconsideration. 159 Amicus curiae briefs were filed by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association, Seagate Technologies, Inc., the
Federal Circuit Bar Association, and the Intellectual Property Own-
ers, Inc. The cases were argued in banc on March 11, 1993.
3. PTO's arguments on appeal
Alappat presented three main issues. First, whether 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 1 6 requires the PTO to interpret means-plus-function limita-
tions during prosecution as limited to disclosed structure and its
equivalents. The same issue was presented in Donaldson. Second,
whether CCPA authority for treatment of means-plus-function claims
as process claims is still valid; if so, whether the claim is properly
treated as a process; finally, if so, whether the claim passes the Free-
152. 618 F.2d 758, 768-69 (1980).
153. See supra note 112.
154. Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
155. Id. at 1341-44.
156. Id. at 1344-45.
157. Id. at 1345.
158. In re Alappat, 980 F.2d 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
159. Id. at 1439-40.
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man-Walter-Abele test for statutory subject matter. Third, whether
the Commissioner has authority to designate an expanded panel on
reconsideration. Only the first two issues will be considered.
a. PTO's interpretation of § 112 6160
Both prior to and after the adoption of the 1952 Patent Act, the
PTO interpreted means-plus-function limitations to include all means
for performing a recited function. 161 Thus, a means-plus-function lim-
itation is considered to be met by any prior art means which performs
the identical function, without regard to whether the prior art means
is an "equivalent." This interpretation comports with (1) the principle
that the claims measure the invention; (2) the rule that during exami-
nation claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation; and
(3) the rule that limitations are not read into the claims.
A fundamental principle of patent law is that the claims measure
the invention. 62 The claims are the legally operative part of the pat-
ent. Moreover, the doctrine of "integration" of a written instrument
requires that the claims be self-contained and the meaning be ascer-
tainable without reference to applicants' arguments and interpreta-
tion.' 63 Claims should mean what they say.
During prosecution before the PTO, when the claims may be
amended, claim language is given its broadest reasonable interpreta-
tion, and limitations appearing in the specification are not to be read
160. Additional background on the § 112 6 issue may be found at 2 PATENT LAW
PERSPECTIVES, § 2.9[5], at 2-1171 to 2-1172.8 (2d ed. 1992).
161. See Paul H. Blaustein, Functional Claims Under the Patent Act of 1952, 26 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 613, 631 (1958) ("The rule that a means clause recited to cover an element
is met by any structure, not limited to equivalents, which performs that function, is pre-
served") (citation omitted); Charles F. Pigott, Jr., Equivalents in Reverse, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 291, 337-38 (1966); Edward D. Manzo, "Means" Claims in Patent Infringement Liti-
gation, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 97, 111 (1986).
162. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942); 1 ANTHONY
N. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS, ii-vi (2d ed. 1971).
163. As Judge Learned Hand stated in Catalin Corp. of America v. Catalazuli Mfg. Co.,
79 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir. 1935):
In each aspect they [the claims] should be self-contained; that is the very purpose
of their embodiment in a formal grant, which is all that is accessible to the public
without much trouble and vastly more uncertainty. If the doctrine of the "inte-
gration" of a written instrument has any basis at all, surely it should apply to such
a document, for if a patent can be construed only by threading one's way through
all the verbal ingenuities which casuistical solicitors develop to circumvent the
objections of examiners, a labyrinth results, from which there is no escape.
See also 1 Deller, supra note 162, § 70 ("While an application is pending in the Patent
Office, undue breadth of a claim must be cured by amendment, not by interpretation.").
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into the claims. 64 The broadest reasonable interpretation is a judi-
cially sanctioned mechanism for maximizing the possibility that the
PTO will issue patent claims which are valid.165 Means-plus-function
limitations, read literally, "encompass any means for performing the
recited function.' 1 66 Therefore, the PTO argued that its interpreta-
tion of means-plus-function limitations as having the same scope as
the literal language was inherently consistent with the principle of
broadest reasonable interpretation.
Applicants are not required to disclose all possible equivalents of
the disclosed structure or even to know of their existence.167 There-
fore, it is reasonable for the PTO to presume that applicants intend
means-plus-function limitations to cover all means for performing the
function known to those skilled in the art.168 If a means-plus-function
limitation literally reads on a known prior art means which performs
the identical function that the applicant regards as "non-equivalent"
or "accidental" anticipation of the claim language, applicant cannot
argue that the claim particularly points out and distinctly claims the
"subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention" under
section 112, paragraph two. Applicant can amend the claims using
express language.
It is proper to read a claim in light of the specification to interpret
what is meant by an express word or phrase in the claim, but it is
improper to narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly reading in
disclosed limitations from the specification which have no express ba-
164. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319,
321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Podlesak v. Mclnnerney, 1906 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 265,268 (Comm'r
Pat. 1906). On the other hand, in patent infringement litigation, where a patentee cannot
amend the claims and where claims are entitled to a statutory presumption of validity, a
court may construe a claim more narrowly so as to sustain its validity if possible. Prater,
415 F.2d at 1404 n.30.
165. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404-05; In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858-59 (Fed. Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FED-
ERAL CIRCUIT 152-54 (2d ed. 1991); In re Carr, 297 F. 542, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (prede-
cessor reviewing court to the C.C.P.A.).
166. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
167. See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("There is and can
be no requirement that applicants describe or predict every possible means of accomplish-
ing that function."); S.R.I. Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (in banc) (plurality opinion) ("The law does not require the impossible. Hence, it
does not require that an applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possi-
ble future embodiment of his invention.").
168. See Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 354 (1882) ("The patentee seeks the broadest
claim he can get. The [Patent] office, in behalf of the public, is obliged to resist this con-
stant pressure.").
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sis in the claims.169 "Means" is a broad but definite term and does not
require resort to the specification.
The PTO interpreted the language "construed to cover" in sec-
tion 112, paragraph six, as referring to post-issuance claim "construc-
tion" by a court, not to claim "interpretation" by the PTO. At the
time of the 1952 Patent Act, there was a distinction between claim
"construction" by a court and claim "interpretation" by the Patent
Office. 7 ° Further, the PTO argued that "equivalents" in section 112,
paragraph six, was a codification of the "reverse doctrine of
equivalents" which involves later developers and infringement, not
patentability. Section 112, paragraph six, was never intended to per-
mit claims which read literally on prior art.
The PTO relied on In re Lundberg171 and In re Henatsch,'72 since
neither had been overruled. In Lundberg, the CCPA squarely ad-
dressed the issue of whether section 112, paragraph six (then para-
graph 3), allowed limitations from the disclosure to be read into
means limitations to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior
art. The CCPA held that the last paragraph of section 112 was
subordinate to the requirement of section 112, paragraph two, that the
claim define the invention, without limitations imported from the
specification to impart patentability. 173 This position was reiterated in
169. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404; In re Priest, 582 F.2d 33, 37 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (inferen-
tial limitations are not to be read into the claims); In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.
1982) ("Many of appellant's arguments fail from the outset because.., they are not based
on limitations appearing in the claims.").
170. Cf 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 45.04 (5th ed. 1992) ("There are numerous
judicial and juridical expressions which distinguish between interpretation and construc-
tion on the ground that interpretation determines the meaning of words and construction
determines the application of words to the facts.").
171. 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
172. 298 F.2d 954 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
173. Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 547-48:
Congress did not intend, by incorporating the third paragraph into section 112, to
destroy certain basic precepts of patent law. Thus, though appellants' arguments
would necessarily lead to the opposite conclusion, it is still true that "the claim is
the measure of the invention." The requirement in the second paragraph of sec-
tion 112 that "the specification shall conclude with one or more claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention" has not been at all diminished by the addition of the
third [now sixth] paragraph; the latter paragraph must be read in the light of the
first and second paragraphs and given an interpretation consistent with their clear
meaning. In re Arbeit, [206 F.2d 927 (C.C.P.A. 1953)].
... [N]otwithstanding the third paragraph of section 112, it is the language itself
of the claims which must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention, without limitations imported
from the specification, whether such language is couched in terms of means plus
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Henatsch.174 Statutes must be construed as a whole.1 75 Following
both cases there have been reenactments of section 112. The PTO
argued that it must be presumed that Congress was aware of and ap-
proved the judicial pronouncements in Lundberg and Henatsch when
it reenacted sectionll2 without changing the substance of the last
paragraph. 76
The main argument against the PTO's position was that sec-
tion 112, paragraph six, does not distinguish between infringement
and ex parte prosecution. However, in the PTO's view, that argument
does not address the point that "construed to cover" coupled with
"equivalents" limits the applicable portion of section 112, paragraph
six, to infringement. Nor does that argument deal with Lundberg and
Henatsch, or analyze section 112, paragraph six, in terms of the statute
as a whole. It was also argued that language in the later CCPA case of
In re Knowlton177 sub silentio overruled Lundberg. The language re-
lied upon in Knowlton178 stated that section 112, paragraph six (then
paragraph three), does not impose any additional disclosure require-
ments to that in section 112, paragraph 1, which is merely consistent
with the intent of section 112, paragraph six, to allow claiming in
means-plus-function format that exceeds the scope of the enabling dis-
closure. Knowlton did not hold that section 112, paragraph six, per-
mits disclosed structure and equivalents to be read into a means clause
to distinguish over prior art.
The CCPA's and PTO's interpretation of section 112, paragraph
six, was unchallenged after Lundberg, until the creation of the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals.179 Equivalents were not used to limit the
scope of claims during examination. Until Bond, there was no known
case reversing the PTO on the basis that a prior art means was "non-
equivalent" to structure disclosed in the specification. The PTO ar-
gued that if its interpretation was reversed, it would be possible for
the PTO to issue two "non-interfering" patents containing identically
worded claims to patentably different inventions. Manifestly, the
PTO argued that this was not what Congress intended.
function or consists of a detailed recitation of the inventive matter. Limitations in
the specification not included in the claim may not be relied upon to impart pat-
entability to an otherwise unpatentable claim.
174. 298 F.2d at 957-58.
175. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 170, § 46.05 ("Thus, it is not proper to confine inter-
pretation to the one section to be construed." (footnote omitted)).
176. See Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985), rev'g Lindahl v. OPM,
718 F.2d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (in banc).
177. 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
178. Id. at 1366.
179. See supra note 81.
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b. Mathematical algorithm
The CCPA recognized that the subject matter of a claim, though
drafted in means-plus-function "apparatus" terms, may be indistin-
guishable from a process. 180 Therefore, although claim fifteen was
nominally to a "rasterizer," it was argued that the apparatus title was
not determinative.
Naturally, as the PTO pointed out, it would be administratively
simpler to have a per se. rule that claims in means-plus-function format
are statutory subject matter. However, the PTO is not writing on a
clean slate. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' failure to address
the CCPA's treatment of "all means" claims in Iwahashi created un-
certainty in the law which needed to be clarified in Alappat.
The Walter test applied by the PTO is whether "the claims are
truly drawn to specific apparatus distinct from other apparatus capa-
ble of performing identical functions," '181 as evidenced by the claim
language itself, not by limitations of structure and equivalents read in
under section 112, paragraph six. The public is entitled to know what
specific apparatus the claims are limited 'to so it knows how it can
practice the mathematical algorithm without infringing. The interpre-
tation of section 112, paragraph six, is especially critical under sec-
tion 101 since the claims are not compared against prior art. It would
be problematic at best to try to determine equivalents in the abstract.
There are certain common factors among the five CCPA cases,
which treat means claims as process claims. All claims were in the
simple form of a, series of "means for" performing steps. Part of the
disclosed apparatus in each specification was apparently a known gen-
eral purpose digital computer operating on a stored program; that the
claims read on old apparatus performing programmed method steps
was an indication that the applicant was really trying to patent the
process embodied in the computer program, rather than some specific
new and nonobvious apparatus. It is not clear from the statements of
facts in the cases what other physical structure was disclosed. How-
ever, the PTO was unaware of any case where the PTO was reversed
on the basis that the CCPA read disclosed structure or equivalents
into the means terms.
It was argued by Alappat that Meyer' 82 requires the PTO to in-
terpret means-plus-function limitations as corresponding to structure
disclosed in the specification in a section 101 determination. Meyer
180. See supra note 95.
181. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
182. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("[I]n accordance with 35 U.S.C.§ 112, paragraph 6, claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 drafted in means plus function format are
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itself treated a means-plus-function claim as a process claim. 183 The
claims in Meyer involved a mental process that a neurologist might
follow in making a diagnosis, although rejection was based on mathe-
matical algorithms. The reference to section 112, paragraph six, in
Meyer is based on a holding of Prater and Bernhart, that claims are
not nonstatutory subject matter, where structure is disclosed, because
the means-plus-function limitations are capable of being carried out
by nonstatutory methods, such as by a human being. Thus, the PTO
argued that the specification is used to determine whether applicant is
trying to claim "mental steps," not to read structure into the means
clauses.
As far as the PTO could determine, claim fifteen in Alappat fit
the profile of the CCPA cases. All limitations were in "means for"
form. There was no language either indicating the means must be sep-
arate means or connecting the means together to form a spacial ar-
rangement of means. Importantly, Alappat admitted that
claim fifteen reads on a general purpose digital computer running a
computer program. The fact that claim fifteen was admitted to read
on two such diverse apparatus as a known computer and the disclosed
special apparatus, is evidence that claim fifteen is not limited to spe-
cific apparatus under the Walter test and should be treated as a pro-
cess claim.
In the PTO's view, assuming claim fifteen could be treated as a
process claim, it failed the two-step test of Freeman-Walter-A bele.
Under the first step, every paragraph in claim fifteen was found to
indirectly recite a mathematical equation or operation disclosed in the
specification as part of an overall algorithm or procedure to calculate
illumination intensity data values. In addition, the PTO considered
Alappat's arguments that no mathematical formula was expressly re-
cited and that there might be other equivalent, undisclosed, ways of
obtaining the recited quantities in claim fifteen without using a mathe-
matical computation, to be unpersuasive and inconsistent with cases
like Grams and Arrhythmia. Under the second step, the mathematical
steps were not applied to an "otherwise statutory process." Claim fif-
teen defines mathematical operations which convert numbers from
one form, numerical vectors in a data list, into another form, numeri-
cal illumination intensity data. Mathematical manipulation of abstract
data is not statutory subject matter.184 The preamble stated that the
to be examined in light of the 'corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.').
183. Id. at 795 n.3.
184. See In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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vector list input data represents sample magnitudes of an input
waveform; however, this was considered data abstract from any real
physical process or signals.185 There is no question that the specifica-
tion disclosed statutory apparatus in addition to the nonstatutory
mathematical algorithm. The issue was whether the claim defined the
apparatus or was so broad as to preempt the mathematical algorithm
itself.
4. The outcome
Donaldson was decided before Alappat. In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "plain and
unambiguous meaning of paragraph six is that one construing means-
plus-function language in a claim must look to the specification and
interpret that language in light of the corresponding structure, mate-
rial, or acts described therein, and equivalents thereof, to the extent
that the specification provides such disclosure."' 86 The court also held
"that paragraph six applies regardless of the context in which the in-
terpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., whether as a
part of a patentability determination in the PTO or as part of a valid-
ity or infringement determination in a court.'1 87 Moreover, "[t]o the
extent that In re Lundberg ... or any other precedent of this court
suggests or holds to the contrary, it is expressly overruled."' 88 The
PTO has issued guidelines to its patent examiners about how to follow
Donaldson.
In Alappat, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals followed its in-
terpretation of section 112, paragraph six, announced in Donaldson
and reversed the PTO on the merits. The majority held that the
"Board majority therefore erred as a matter of law in refusing to ap-
ply § 112 [ 6 in rendering its § 101 patentable subject matter determi-
nation.' 1 89 The court further held that when claim fifteen was
properly construed in accordance with section 112, paragraph six, by
substituting the structure disclosed in the specification, or an
equivalent thereof, for each means-plus-function limitation, "claim 15
unquestionably recites a machine, or apparatus, made up of a combi-
nation of known electronic circuitry elements."' 9° The court acknowl-
edged that this did not end the section 101 inquiry since precedent
suggests that the mathematical algorithm exception may apply to true
185. See supra note 146.
186. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
187. Id. (footnote omitted).
188. Id. at 1193-94.
189. In re Alappat, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 1994).
190. Id. at 1555.
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apparatus claims.191 The court announced that "the proper inquiry in
dealing with the so called mathematical algorithm subject matter as a
whole is a disembodied mathematical concept, whether categorized as
a mathematical formula, mathematical equation, mathematical al-
gorithm, or the like, which in essence represents nothing more than a
'law of nature,' 'natural phenomenon,' or 'abstract idea."1 92 The
court concluded that under such a test claim fifteen was directed to a
machine, not a disembodied mathematical concept.
193
The PTO is in the process of drafting guidelines to follow Alap-
pat. One remaining question is whether the court has created a rule
that claims in means-plus-function format are statutory subject matter.
The court seemed to leave open the possibility that under appropriate
circumstances, e.g., as in Abele,'94 Pardo,195 and Walter'96 where there
was "apparent lack of any supporting structure in the specification
corresponding to the claimed 'means' elements,"' 97 it might still be
proper to treat claims as "in effect nothing more than process claims
in the guise of apparatus claims," since the statement of facts in Abele,
Pardo, and Walter are uninformative about the disclosure in the speci-
fication. It may be that a purely software disclosure (e.g., program
code and flowcharts), may be one circumstance where a means-plus-
function claim could be treated as a process claim, but even this is in
doubt given the court's reliance on statements that a computer pro-
gram in effect creates a new machine.' 98 It is clear though that
Maucorps and Meyer are not to be followed, since the court found
that the CCPA did not properly apply section 112, paragraph six, in
those cases.' 99
IV
Conclusion
Mathematical algorithms under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the interpre-
tation of means-plus-function limitations under section 112, paragraph
six, during ex parte prosecution are two major issues affecting patent-
ing of computer software and hardware. The PTO's perspective is
that of the Government agency charged with the duty of issuing valid
191. Id. at 1555-56.
192. Id. at 1557.
193. Id.
194. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
195. 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
196. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
197. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554-55 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 1994).
198. Id. at 1558.
199. Id. at 1554-55.
19941
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
patents. The PTO requires consistent developments of the law if it is
to maintain uniform and definite standards for a patent.
Analysis of mathematical algorithms and statutory subject matter
in the computer process area is in a relatively mature stage of devel-
opment, with a history of cases going back over 20 years. Neverthe-
less, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for statutory subject matter can be
subtle and difficult to apply. The court of appeals' decision in
In re Grams demonstrates that the PTO can apply the analysis objec-
tively. In view of the importance of mathematical algorithms in the
computer area, it is not expected that the issue will disappear. The
PTO's goal is to make sure that issued patent claims define statutory
subject matter.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' in banc decisions in Don-
aldson and Alappat on the interpretation of means-plus-function limi-
tations during ex parte prosecution will affect examination in all art
areas, not just in computers. The exact nature of the impact on gen-
eral PTO practice cannot be predicted. However, the direction for
interpreting means-plus-function language is now set.
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